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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
POWER-TRAIN, INC., and 
JACK H. WYNN, 
Plaintiffs and 
Appellants 
vs. ) Case No. 14302 
PAUL M. STUVER, 
Defendant and 
Appellee 
B R I E F O F A P P E L L E E 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an interlocutory appeal from an order granting 
Respondent's Motion to Dismiss the above entitled action. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE BY LOWER COURT 
An order granting the Appellee s Motion to Dismiss 
Appellant's complaint was entered on the 17th day of September, 
1975. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellee seeks to have the order of the trial court 
dismissing the above-entitled action affirmed., 
STATEMENT OF FACTS \ 
1. On October 20, 1973 Paul M. Stuver, of Eureka, 
California, entered into an "Assignment of Letters Patent" 
agreement with. Jack II. Wynn, of Eureka, California, regarding 
Letters Patent No. 3,090,363 pertaining to a patented item 
known as "Min-J-c.—» 
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2. Shortly thereafter, assignee Wynn entered into 
an Exclusive Patent License Agreement with Power-Train, Inc., 
a Nevada corporation, qualified to do business within the state 
of Utan, wherein Wynn, among other things, granted Power-Train, 
Inc. exclusive rights to manufacture, use sell, and market 
the "Mini-Sam" motor. 
3. On February 20 1974, Paul M. Stuver entered into an 
"Assignment of Rights, Including Patent Rights" agreement wherein 
he conveyed an assignment of all his rights regarding a "hydraulic 
pump and braking system" to Jack H. Wynn. 
4. On February 21, 1974, Mr. Wynn granted an exclusive 
Patent License to Power-Train, Inc. to manufacture use, market, 
and sell the hydraulic pump and braking system. 
5. On November 1, 1974 Paul M. Stuver brought an action 
as plaintiff in tlie Superior Court of California, County of 
Humboldt, docket number 56571, against Jack H. Wynn and Power-
Train Inc., and Does I through X inclusive, as defendants, 
for rescission of the two assignment agreements. 
6* On December 10, 1974, an answer was filed on behalf 
of Jack H. Wynn and Power-Train, Inc. in the Superior Court of 
California, which denied the allegations of Mr. Stuver's complaint 
and set up as affirmative defenses, among other things misrepreser 
tations by Stuver with respect to the legal integrity of the 
patents conveyed, and misrepresentations as to the performance 
and cost characteristics of tne inventions. No Cross-Claim was 
% 
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filed at tne time the original answer was filed. 
7. On June 23 1975 Jack H. Wynn and Power-Train Inc. 
commenced an action against Paul M. Stuver in the District Court 
of the Third Judicial District in and for Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, File No. 228733 (Exhibit A attached herewith). The 
alleged basis of the claims included, among other, misrepresen-
tations as to the cost characteristics and performance of the 
inventions assigned, willful, wrongful and wanton sabotage by 
Stuver of the equipment, manufacturing devices and research 
data of power-Train, Inc. 
8. Defendant Stuver moved to dismiss the Utah action 
on the grounds of the prior, pending action in California. The 
defendant urged that since the suit had originally been instituted 
in the California courts, and that appellants (defendants in the 
California action) had a speedy and appropriate remedy in that 
action, and since California s Compulsory Counterclaim statute 
would bar any subsequent suit on actions arising out of the same 
transaction occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences 
judicial comity should be exercised and the Utah court should 
refrain from exercising jurisdiction over the matter. The 
Honorable Bryant H. Croft, on September 17, 1975 held that the 
court was of the opinion that the plaintiffs-appellants1 fifteen 
causes of action were compulsory counterclaims within the meaning 
of the statutej and that the principles of comity required that 
the Utah case be dismissed. 
-3-
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9. On October 17, 1975, Plaintiffs-Appellants peti-
tioned the Utah Supreme Court for an order permitting them 
to appeal the ruling of the lower court. The motion was granted 
November 17, 1975. 
10. On November 12, 1975, Plaintiffs-Appellants petitionei 
the California court for an order allowing leave to file a 
Cross-Complaint in the California action. Counsel, in his 
Motion for Order Allowing the Filing of Cross-Complaint (Exhibit 
B, attached herewith), admitted that although tne Cross-Complaint 
is difference in form from the action originally filed in Utah 
the cause of action are substantially the same as those contained 
in the Utah action. The Motion to Allow the Cross-Complaint was 
/ 
granted by the California Court on December 30, 1975, and on 
January 2, 1976, the California Cross-Complaint was filed 
(Exhibit C, attached herewith). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
UTAH AND CALIFORNIA COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIM 
STATUTES WERE ENACTED WITH THE INTENTION OF 
MINIMIZING MULTIPLICITY OF ACTIONS AND APPELLANTS 
CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED AS 
COUNTERCLAIMS IN THE CALIFORNIA ACTION e 
The law abhors a multiplicity of actions. In order 
t limit the number of actions between the same parties many 
n as of civil procedures have been enacted which consolidate 
re ited actions in a single suit. Some of these procedures 
are discretionary whereas others are mandatory. California Rules 
of Civil Procedure, Section 426.30, states: 
_4_ Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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(a) Except as otherwise provided by statute, 
if a party against whom a complaint has been 
filed and served fails to allege in a cross-
complaint Jtf22LJ-£^  
(at the time of serving his answer to the 
complaint) he has against the plaintiff, 
such party may not thereafter in any other 
action assert against the plaintiff the 
related cause of action. (Emphasis added.) 
Section 426.10(c) clarifies what is meant by "any related 
cause of action." It says: 
Related cause of action" means a cause of 
action which arises out of the same transaction, 
occurrences, or series of transactions or 
occurrences as the cause of action which the 
plaintiff alleges in his complaint. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The legislative purpose behind the enactment of the California 
Compulsory Counterclaim provision was to provide for the settle-
ment, in a single action, of all the conflicting claims between 
the parties arising out of the same transaction, or series of 
transactions, and thus avoid a multiplicity of actions and a 
possibility of conflicting results. Bewley v. Riggs, 68 Cal. 
Rptr. 520, 262 Cal. App. 2d 188 (1968); Flickinger v. Swedlow 
Engineering Co., 45 C.2d 388, 289 P.2d 214 (1955); Sylvester v/ 
Soulsburg, 60 Cal. Rptr. 218 252 Cal. App. 2d 185 (1967); 
Carey v. Cusack, 54 Cal. Rptr. 244, 245 Cal. App. 57 (1966). 
The Utah legislature, recognizing the need for consolida-
tion of all claims arising out of one transaction or series of 
transactions, enacted a similar statute. Rule 13(a) of the Utan 
Rules of Civil Procedure (1953 as amended) states: 
A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any 
claim wuich at the time of serving the pleading 
-5-
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of the pleader has against any opposing party, 
if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence 
that is the subject matter of the opposing party's 
claim and does not require for its adjudication 
the presence of third parties of whom the court 
cannot acquire jurisdiction. (Emphasis added.) 
The primary purpose behind Utah s Compulsory Counterlaim statute, 
as with all compulsory counterclaim statutes is the minimi-
zation of actions between the same parties arising out of the 
same series of transactions and the avoidance of the possibility 
of conflicting results. In Gillman v. Hansen, 26 Utah 2d 165 
486 P.2d 1045 (1971) the defendant s attorney, appointed by 
an insurance carrier to represent the client regarding property 
damage to her car, discovered, after filing an answer to a 
complaint, that there should properly have been a counterclaim 
filed for personal injuries. Failure of the lower court to allow 
the counterclaim the Utah Supreme Court held was error since 
failure to assert the claim in such an action would bar the 
claim forever, pursuant to Rule 13 (a), Utati Rules of Civil 
Procedure, on the theory tnat all claims arising out of one 
transaction or series of transactions should be adjudicated in a 
single action. National Surety Corp. v. Christiansen Brothers, 
Inc., 29 Utah 2d 460, 511 P.2d 731 (1973) applied the same 
reasoning when they held that any claim the defendant had 
against the plaintiff for back construction charges necessarily 
would have arisen out of the same transaction (i.e. , the building 
of the hospital) and tnerefore, snould have been regarded as 
compulsory counterclaims, pursuant to Rule 13(a) in tnat action-
Failure to assert any of the related claims would bar recovery 
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." II i i 'i. ti subsequent action. 
... Utah and California court • K P T roasj steri t ly recog-
nized and . -1ales rules statutes, and case law when 
, i inconsistent with-their own laws or fMiltiic |N*I IIJ hi 
Biewend v. Biewend, ,,17 C !!rl l()>*. " N I'.lid 701 (1941), th-
("* * ' ' . J stressed that there is a strong1 puliJi., p. ;y 
i a v o n n ^ enforcement duties validly- In Jackson v, Jovner, 
12 T't*" "VI "f . (1962) ?JSL case in which the •' •"• • . 
delendan ;roHuO"i *>' tr. iluminuru awning compnm , (tau tailed •• 
fjj* m d record • •an documents with the Secretary ^i 
yoming i > qualify his compam ! .*• *usines 
state as required by Wyoming v" 
Since appellant, was the, president of • i" ?> \- . 
Utah corporation-and the person who actually 
.', - >• transacted the ^ busijies^s in Wyoming, therfe
 x ^ 
'-'- " appears ;to be iro good "reason or public poJLicy ; 
:
 v
 why pur &ouifts should not entertain an action 
against Him Abased on the statutorily created 
. liabi'H+v i> Wyoming "T>7 P*2d 452£ 454. 
Th<* eoi; ' ipheld ; liabilit .<. > . -int based on the 
\iyomi n<j - • : •: aieli conduct. If « 
rrom the Jacksoi Joyner, supra tb - vourt1 il in t ai: I '• 
recognize and apply * .- - • - 4iso in accordance 
with ll"1, -ha Iniii .-. Cahoon v. Pelton, 9 Utah 224, 342 P, l*.i MI 
( t 9 5 y ; . • •• ' ~ ;.' ..-<"•. ;;:••' 
Since Utah ,>, Compulsory Counterclaim ^iutut . i-* similar 
tn <!; i ( 11 orina s Compulsory Counterclaim *>tatuv , -> * i r
 f .3 
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same requirement on the defendant to plead all related causes 
of action in a counterclaim or have such claims barred forever 
(Gillman v. Hansen, supra), Utah courts should recognize and 
apply those requirements in the case at bar (Jackson v. Joyner, 
supra). The causes of action alleged by appellants in the Utah 
case arose out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of 
transactions or occurrences as those causes of action alleged in 
the California case. In Sylvester v. Soulsburg, 60 Cal. Rptr. 218 
224, 252 Cal. App. 2d 185 (1967) the court defines "transaction11 
as "all of the phases of the relationship" which give rise to the 
suit. The relationship between Appellee and Appellants arose as 
a result of the planned development of the "Mini-Sam" motor and tl 
"hydraulic pump and braking system." When Stuver began his suit 
in California, actions regarding all phases of that relationship 
should have been resolved there in a single action. Based on 
considerations of comity (Sees Schaefer v. Milner, 156 Kan. 768, 
137 P.2d 156 (1943); Simmons v. Superior Court, 96 Cal. App. 2d 1! 
214 P.2d 844 (1950); Greenhouse v. Hargrave, 509 P.2d 1360 
(Okl. 1973) Judge Croft dismissed the action. 
Appellants contend that since many of their causes 
of action sound in tort, whereas appellee s cause of action in 
the California action sounds in contract, the claims should not 
be considered as arising out of the same transaction or series 
of transactions. This position is clearly untenable. In 
Sylvester v. Soulsburg, 60 Cal. Rptr. 218 252 Cal. App. 2d 185 
-8-
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(196^ x ih- *•• t dx.sc . .' - • i i^up of rnii'jterclcjim.^  based 
on UJ ii - l - i.i^ e^  ^f j.'f-.-j r?.-: Mi0-u asbertcf; mplaint. 
The court said; ; . 
It is co;«^mled by the appellants that tin. p< * uuai 
countercJaim which could have been urged la. tb - present 
appellants in OIL fir-t ca-e uoubJ not !ia\ be• ; 
sufficient mJtr Section 4-1*J (repealed. .V»w iJb.lOJ 
H the Code o! Civil Procedure, because the complaint 
n\ the firs>i case was based on contract, and the 
counterclaim if any, woul d hav e been based on tort, 
and, also in somewhat similar vein, that the plaintiffs 
i n trie first case were acting in the capacity -
a person claiming under contract, and the potential 
counter-claimants would have been acting in the 
capacity of person injured by tort. This attempted 
distinction is * f sound. As is said in 2 Vitkin, 
California Pror< h r^ P7oading, Section 580, at page 
1591-
"The complaint may be in contract and 
counterclaim in tort, or vise versa.. 
60 Cal Ry'r. .?|.- _ M 
F a i l u r e to a s s e r t i c m n l t i t la i tu b e c a u s e b a s e d .*:• d i f f e r r - " • :HJ-*es 
of a c J i - ' i Uu>r el o r e b a r s t h e i n s t i h i i ••*. * •- . i 
1
 Mi' same a c t i o n In B r u n s w i g JJrutf Co. v . S p r i n g e r , 55 C.t *;>; . • • 
Lid 4 4 4 , MO P.L'r! "'"K n * M J ) . (Jie C a l i f o r n i a - n n r i ,j ,}, * u —ed 
"'"•i" in in J 11 f ?; oi' s e p a r a t e c a u s e s of a c f i r . nu,-! jc t i -a* and 
h e l d t h a * m<re a n--.. > t v., , ,- ;. ,, a , c o n d i t i o n a l s a l e s 
agreemei f r a u d A* <* nsked • > riamnsv - o ,. 
was d e a l * . i u b mcumben: ' f* «! i . •."* ^ee i mi- . -1*-
(now s e c t e n * U* J-1- * any c la ims aga ins t thn h i r -er . 
Not 1 la* \ e..f>-. ..• p o - ^ i b l e t l n i a - '»• ! .- *., .• 
the judgment for the buyer barred ,i subsequent action :-. 'ire 
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sellers for moneys due under the conditional sales contract. 
This principle applies to the facts in the present case. The 
appellants, in their California action, according to Brunswig; 
Drug Co. v. Spring;er, supra, must present all claims related 
to the transaction between themselves and respondents in the 
present California case or barred from subsequent actions. On 
the other hand, recognizing sister state law as per Jackson v„ 
Joyner, supra, Utah is bound to apply California law and bar 
appellants from filing a second action over the same transactions 
or series of transactions. Utah also recognizes this in Gillman 
supra, where importance of litigating all related issues in a sing] 
action. 
Appellants argue that not all of the causes of action 
contained in their complaint in the present action arose out 
of the same transaction occurrence, or series of transactions 
or occurrences as appellee s California claim. They contend that 
a claim can only be considered compulsory if it raises common 
questions of law that would justify requiring all of the defendant 
claims to be adjudicated in the proceeding brought by the plain-
tiff. As early as King v. Coe Commission Co., 93 Minn. 52, 100 N. 
667 (1904) courts have dealt with tne interpretation of the term 
"transaction.11 The court states: 
The term "transaction", as used in the statute, 
is obviously broader than the term "contract" 
and authorized matters to be set up as counter-
claims which could not be so pleaded as 
arising upon tne contract relied upon by 
-10-
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plaintiff. . The cause of action arises from the 
transaction set forth in the complaint when the 
combinati on -*i atl> and events, circumstances 
and defaults, upon which the rights of the 
parties are based, .when viewed i n one aspect, 
rest. 1.1 in the plaintiff's right of action and 
when viewed in another aspect, result favorably 
to defendant. 100 N.W fifi7, 668. 
The interpretation of the term "transaction1 * m - • ;,»; ^ 
not need to he applied rneroh, I nuHors ar.. - m & innn » •-
c^ oii re* i > quo> It i oit, but I FOIH a 1.1 matters ajlsine, friv ' le 
circumstances, acts, and events which p \ > -. ^ n i ; p ^ f s 
cause *if ao (i*»o In Sylvester v> Soulsburg, 60 r; : KjU: ulo, 
252 t-'al App. 2d 185 (1967) the cour iscusseu ! ••• .. -• 
of " transaction11 furthei " ; i \ i * 1 < • n 1 1 r I 
"The word transaction embraces almo L ai..> et; it* 
by a person which affects another's right and 
of which a cause of action may arri^- n/x " I r..it:-. 
218 2?^ ?' 
The court went _.. to apply the d"tNiMn'M ' • compulsory counter- \ 
claims ,i ,. : . . -• . • • . .-•;.• • • •'' • '^  .-
 :' • -'  "••" ' . • • 
The whole case turns w ?•« :: cua :i^  .,r "'transaction" 
as used in the code section uc think that, wh-.^e 
there is an action on a contract for the s.Je •< 
. . land arid the personal property used on ii with the 
purchaser in possession, and there exist:- a claim 
by the purchaser that he has been wrongea by the 
seller in not complying with the terms of the c ritract. 
the whole controversy and all its parts relate 
collectively to a single "transaction^. and thai 
public policy enunciated in Section 439 of the C>de 
of Civil Procedure (now 426.10) require thai alI 
of the phases of the relationship should ho resoi *-<-.•? 
a single litigation or be forever barrec1 
60 Ca)- Rptr. 
I n Llic ca se a t t&nce^ i-1 \ * * n 
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plaintiff's cause of action in the California courts as mentioned 
above arose from the arrangement between appellants and appellee 
for the development of the "Mini-Sam" motor and the "hydraulic 
pump and braking system." (The contract in question in the 
California case, the working relationship between appellants and 
appellee, and the alleged torts by the appellee which is the 
basis of the action in Utah, arose from the planned development 
of the products or was all part of that transaction*) This line 
of reasoning was followed in Scott v. Waggoner, 48 Mont. 536, 
139 P. 454 (1914). In that case, the action was based upon a 
lease of a hotel. The plaintiff asked for rent and damages for 
waste. A counterclaim was set up for wrongful eviction and 
conversion of personal property. In holding that the counterclai 
was properly pleaded, the court said: 
That these provisions are designed to enable 
parties litigant to adjust their differences 
in one action so far as that can logically 
be done, and thereby to prevent multiplicity 
of suits, is made plain by the further provision 
that, if the defendant omit to set up a 
counterclaim in the classes mentioned in 
subdivision 1 of section 6541, neither he nor 
his assignee can afterwards maintain an action 
against the plaintiff thereon. Section 6547. 
For statutes so highly remedial, a broad and 
liberal construction is required, in order 
that the purposes designed by them shall be 
most completely served. 139 P.2d 454, 455 
Also in accordance with the above cases requiring a broad 
interpretation of compulsory counterclaim statutes is 
-12-
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Warren v. PeLong, 97 P.2d 792 (1940). In 3 Moore, Federal 
Practice Paragraph 13.13 at 33 (2d ed. 1953), cited with 
approval in MacDonald v. Krause, 362 P.2d 724 (Nev. 1961) 
and applied in that case, the rule is interpreted to mean 
that: 
Subject to the exceptions, any claim that 
is logically related to another claim that 
is being sued on is properly the basis for 
a compulsory counterclaim; only claims that 
are unrelated or are related, but within 
the exceptions, need not be pleaded. 
Judge Croft's determination that the claims in question 
did arise out of the same series of transactions as the 
action pleaded in the California action is supported by 
case law and the natural inferences that such claims were 
logically related. 
Appellants also apparently recognized the relationship 
between the actions alleged by appellee and the causes of action 
alleged in Utah. When Judge Croft ruled against entertaining 
the suit, the appellants immediately instituted a Motion to allow 
them to file the claims in the California action (Exhibit B). 
The motion was granted (Exhibit C) and all of the issues are now 
pending in the California action. 
In the case at bar, appellants are seeking to file an 
additional suit on the same transaction which neither Utah nor 
California would allow. California's statute requiring adjudica-
tion of all related causes of actions in a single suit is similar 
to Utah's and, therefore, is consistent with Utah law and sound 
I 
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public policy. Since appellants have, and have taken advantage 
of, access to the California courts for the remedies sought and 
since such claims would be mandatory under California law the Utah 
court properly refused to let the appellants circumvent the statute 
by instituting the action in Utah. The court properly dismissed 
the Utah action. 
POINT II 
JUDICIAL COMITY WAS PROPERLY EXERCISED IN THE 
REFUSAL OF THE COURT TO ENTERTAIN JURISDICTION 
OVER THE CASE AT BAR. 
Within limits, a plaintiff has the right to pick an 
appropriate tribunal, having jurisdiction, for prosecution of his 
rights. The plaintiff s right in the California action to having 
the matter adjudicated in the forum of his choosing should not 
be defeated by actions of the defendant contrary to statutory 
requirements* The defendant (in the California action, appellant 
here) deliberately refused to comply with the pleading require-
ments and sought to circumvent those requirements by instituting 
the action in Utah. As a general rule, however, a court of 
competent jurisdiction which acquires jurisdiction over the 
subject matter, retains such jurisdiction until the matter is 
finally disposed of. The court in Schaefer v. Milner, 156 Kan. 
768, 137 P.2d 156 (1943) in discussing this general rule said: 
The general rule is well established that when 
a court of competent jurisdiction acquires 
jurisdiction of the subject matter its authority 
continues until tne matter is finally disposed of, 
and that no court of co-ordinate authority should 
interfere with its action. 14 AmJur., 435; 15 
-i4_ 
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C.J. 1134, 1136; 21 C.J.S.. Courts, § 492, pp.745-
748. As said in 15 C.J. 1135, 21 C.J.S., Courts, 
§ 492: "This rule rests on comity and the necessity 
of avoiding conflict* in the execution of judgments 
by independent courts; and is a necessary one 
because any other rule would unavoidably lead to 
perpetual collision and be productive of most 
calamitous results." As stated in Am.Jur. supra.: 
"The principle is essential to the proper and 
orderly administration of the laws; and while its 
observance might be required on the grounds of 
judicial comity and courtesy, it does not rest 
upon such considerations exclusively, but is 
enforced to prevent unseemly, expensive and 
dangerous conflicts of jurisdiction and of 
process. 137 P.2d 156, 160. 
Although a court acquiring jurisdiction over a matter 
should prosecute that matter to finality, several situations may 
arise which terminate the action prior to the ruling on the merits. 
Appellants rely heavily on the principle of "Abatement". Reliance 
on this principle is misplaced and not in point when applied to 
the present case. In order for a cause of action to be pleaded 
in abatement of another, as appellants mention in their brief, 
the general rule is that the parties must be identical, in the same 
position as plaintiff and defendant, identity of issues and 
generally within the same jurisdiction. In such a case Abatement 
exists as a matter of right for defendant in order to avoid 
vexatious litigation. In the case at bar, however, the principle 
of comity, not abatement, applies. Application of the principle 
of comity as contrasted to "Abatement" is shown in Simmons v. 
Superior Court, 96 Cal. App. 2d 119, 214 P.2d 844 (1950), a 
case in which the petitioner, in a Texas action, sought a divorce, 
I 
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a restraining order enjoining the husband from withdrawing funds 
from certain corporations, an accounting, the appointment of a 
receiver, and general relief. The defendant, her husband, filed 
a suit in California seeking some similar relief but also seeking 
relief not sought in the Texas action. The petitioner sought a 
stay of the California proceedings. In discussing the difference 
between a "Plea in Abatement" and a comity, the court said: 
Petitioner did not seek an "Abatement" of the 
California action. She merely sought a "Stay 
of the proceedings." While an abatement and 
a stay of the proceedings are in some respects 
similar, they are not identical. To abate 
a suit is to put an end to its existence. 
Abatement is ordinarily a matter of right. The 
general rule is that the "pendency of a prior 
suit in one state cannot be pleaded in abatement 
or in bar to a subsequent suit in another state 
even though both suits are between the same 
parties and upon the same cause of action." 
(Citation.) However, the court in which the 
second action is brought may in its discretion 
stay or suspend that suit, awaiting decision 
in the first one, or influenced by a spirit 
of comity, may refuse to entertain it, if the 
same relief can be awarded in the prior suit. 
214 P.2d 844, 848 (Emphasis added.) 
Abatement, therefore, is a matter of right whereas comity is 
discretionary with the court. In the case at bar, the trial 
court judge, in the Minute Entry #228733, ruled that: 
The court is of the opinion that said fifteen 
causes of action are compulsory counterclaims 
. that should be filed in the California case 
and that the principles of comity require 
dismissal of the case now before this court. 
(Emphasis added) 
-16-
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The issue, then, is not whether the appellee had a right to the 
abatement of the issue, but whether the trial judge had the 
discretion, based on principles of comity, to refuse to entertain 
jurisdiction. Based upon the Simmons case supra, the judge clear 
had the discretion. 
Appellants argue, however, that the refusal of a court 
to entertain jurisdiction in such a case is a minority opinion. 
That assertion is not supported by case law. In an Oklahoma case, 
Greenhouse v. Hargrave, 509 P.2d 1360 (Okl. 1973) the concept of 
comity was further discussed. In this case, the petitioner sought 
to enjoin further proceedings in Seminole County because identical 
proceedings had previously been filed in Washington Federal Court. 
The court stated: 
Under the facts and circumstances in the case at 
bar, the determining factor is not whether the 
District Court of Seminole County has jurisdiction 
as a matter of law, but whether or not the District 
Court of Seminole County should assume or exercise 
jurisdiction as a matter of judicial comity. 
The doctrine of comity between courts stands for the 
premise that one court should defer action on 
causes properly within its jurisdiction until courts 
of another sovereignty with concurrent powers aid 
already cognizant of the litigation have had an 
opportunity to pass upon the matter. Under the 
doctrine of comity, a court should ordinarily decline 
to entertain jurisdiction of a matter where tlierl? is 
an action pending in a convenient and competent 
forum of a sister state to which the parties may 
apply, and where exercise of jurisdiction by the 
second court might lead to confusion and conflicting 
orders. 509 P.2d 1360, 1363. (Emphasis added) 
The interpretation of judicial comity in the Greenhouse case, 
-17-
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supra., is followed in Perrenoud v. Perrenoud, 206 Kan. 559, 
480 P.2d 749 (1971) in which the court said: 
The general rule is tnat courts snould exercise 
comity between themselves in order to avoid 
expense and harrassment and invonvience to the 
litigants. This general rules is applicable 
not only between courts of coordinate jurisdiction 
within the same state, but between federal courts 
and state courts, and between state courts of 
different states. 480 P.2d 749, 760. (Emphasis added) 
See also Dodge v. Superior Court, 139 Cal. App. 178, 33 P.2d 695, 
34 P.2d 501 (1934). The case at bar seems to fit squarely within 
the meaning, intent, and application of the judicial comity 
principle. The case was initially instituted in the California 
courts by appellee. The issues are almost identical as per tne 
pleadings and statements of California counsel. See Exhibit C. 
The appellant intentionally sought to disregard the Compulsory 
Counterclaim statute, which remedy was available to litigate 
any of the related causes of action, and sought to bring trie 
action in Utah. Under the principles of comity as cited herein, 
the appellants' action in Utah should be dismissed. 
Thus, the ultimate question in the case at bar is 
whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting appellee 
Motion to Dismiss. The general rule in matters concern!tig the 
use of discretionary powers by a trial judge is that such 
discretionary judgment of the judge will be upheld unless it appej 
that the discretion was used arbitrarily, capriciously or with-' 
out reasonable support in fact. Upton v. tieiselt Construction Co 
3 Utah 2d 170, 280 P.2d 971 (1973). The court in Hays y. Superio 
Court, 16 Cal.2d 260, 265, 105 P.2d 975 (1940) said that the 
- *• •*•* ,oe not. an abuse. In the Simmons. 
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case supra, the court held that it was an abuse of discretion 
not to stay the proceeding. The court said: 
We think it manifest that respondent court 
abused its discretion in not staying, as a matter 
of comity, further proceedings in the California 
action until the final determination of the Texas 
action. 214 P.2d 844, 849. 
In an Oklahoma case, Moody v. Branson, 192 Okl. 327, 136 P.2d 
925 (1943) the court said that under the doctrine of comity, a 
court should ordinarily decline to entertain jurisdiction of a 
matter when there is an action already pending in a convenient and 
competent forum of another state to which the parties may apply 
and where exercise of jurisdiction by the second court might 
lead to confusing and conflicting orders. The majority view, 
contrary to the assertions by appellants, is tnat the doctrine 
of comity should be followed unless an overriding policy considera-
tion exists. Comity may be exercised by either staying the pro-
ceedings or refusing to entertain jurisdiction at all. Judge 
Croft, in his discretion, choose not to entertain jurisdiction at 
all. There are no overriding policy consideration to alter his 
decision. Appellants had an opportunity to, were statutorily 
required to and finally did take advantage of the compulsory 
counterclaim provision to seek relief for alleged causes of action 
arising from the same transactions or occurrences as appellee's 
cause of action in California. Clearly, the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion by refusing to exercise jurisdiction over 
the matter. 
I 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court in California having first acquired 
jurisdiction over the matters involved in the case, is the 
proper forum for adjudication of all matters arising from the 
transactions involved. Appellants' causes of action, although 
sounding in tort, logically are related to and arise from the 
transaction or occurrence which is the cause of action relied 
on by appellee in the California case. Being related such 
causes of action should have been filed tuere, which action was 
subsequently taken. The Utah trial judge, after reviewing the 
appellants' causes of action, properly refused to entertain 
jurisdiction of the matter based on considerations of comity. 
His discretionary ruling was well within tue bounds of the 
exercise of such authority and was based on supportive decisions 
from other jurisdictions. The Utan Supreme Court should affirm 
the lower court's determination and refuse to exercise juris-
diction over the matter. 
STEVEN C. VANDERLINDEN 
137 East State Street 
Farmington, Utah 84025 
Attorney for Respondent 
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Orrin G. Hatch 
HATCH t, PLUMB 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
420 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: 533-0444 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
POWER-TRAIN, INC., ) . 
and JACK H. WYNN, .**-.. • ) ' . C O M P L A I N T 
) ' . • . " " . " " " , " 
Plaintiffs, ) 
• : •. ) • ': 
vs. • ) 
) • Civil No. 
PAUL M. STUVER, ) 
• • ' • ) ' • ' • : ' . • • • • ' ' - • ' • • 
Defendant• ) 
The Plaintiffs make the following Complaint against the 
Defendant: • 
FIRST COUNT 
• JURISDICTION V 
1. The Plaintiff is a Nevada corporation, qualified 
to do business within the State bf Utah. 
* • • 
• 2. The Plaintiff, Jack H. Wynn, is an individual. 
residing in Eureka, California. 
3. The Defendant is a resident of the State of California. . 
4. That the Agreements attached hereto and incorporated 
herein by reference as Exhibits "A", "BM, ,fC" and "D", provide 
that the laws of the State of Utah shall govern. 
5. That the Agreements attached hereto as Exhibits "A":, 
,fBM, MCff and "D".were negotiated with the Defendant with the 
State of Utah,% • • . • . ^ V 
6. That the Defendant has had many business contacts -involved 
in these allegations within the State of Utah. 
7. Venue is'proper in this District Court for the Third 
• Judicial'District of Salt Lake County, State of Utah in that the 
acts and transactions' alleged by the Plaintiffs were carried 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
out and made effective in Salt Lake County,* State of Utah, the 
principal place of business of the Plaintiffs. . ' ;. .-•-,-
• FACTS \ •.'; 
8. On October 20, 1973^ Paul M. 'Stuver entered into 
an "Assignment of Letters Patent", a copy of which is-attached 
hereto and incorporated herein by reference as Exhibit "A", 
wherein the Defendant represented that he was the sole and exclu-
sive owner of Letters Patent No. 3,090,363 in the United States 
Patent Office pertaining to an allegedly efficient "Mini-Sam" 
motor (also known as the "Powers-Train"). The assignee was Jack 
H, Wynn of Eureka, California. Shortly thereafter, Jack H. Wynn 
entered into an Exclusive Patent License Agreement with Power-Train,* 
Inc. wherein Jack H. Wynn, as Licensor of said "Mini-Sam" Lettersf 
Patent granted to Power-Train, Inc., among other things, exclusive ' 
rights to manufacture, sel}' and market said invention. A copy 
of the said Exclusive Patent License Agreement between Jack H. * 
Wynn and Power-Train, Inc. is attached hereto.and incorporated 
by reference herein as Exhibit "C". 
9". On the 20th day of February, 1974, the Defendant 
entered into an "Assignment of Rights, Including Patent Rights" 
conveying an assignment of all of his rights, including, but not 
limited to, the patent rights, • to a "...luj;h volume, motiatnin 
pressure, radial piston, hydraulic pump and brakinj; system..." 
("pump") to Jack H. Wynn. A copy of this Agreement is attached 
hereto and incorporated herein by reference as Exhibit "B". 
- 10. On the 21st day of February, 1974, Jack H. Wynn 
granted an Exclusive Patent License to Power-Train, "Inc. to, among 
other things, manufacture, use, sell, market, etc., the high 
•volume, moderate pressure, radial piston, hydraulic pump and 
braking system. A copy of that Exclusive Patent*"License Agreement 
is attached hereto'and incorporated herein by reference herein 
. as Exhibit "D". " \ . 
* -
11, Although, a great deal of consideration has already > 
boon paid and/or transferred to Paul M. Stuver by Jack II« Wynn 
' . ' / • • • • . . . . ' . . • • . • • . . • • 
* 
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and Power-Train, Inc., in- total reliance upon the many repre-
sentations by Paul M. Stuver concerning the viability of these • 
products, the many representations, misrepresentations and war-
ranties made by Stuver have not proven to be true, but-, on the 
contrary, have proven to. be untrue. 
12. That during the negotiations, both before and after 
the execution of the various Agreements attaclied hereto as Exhibits, 
the Defendant/ falsely and fraudulently, and with an intent to 
induce Jack H. Wynn and Power-Train, Inc. (the Defendant knew 
that Jack H. Wynn was the President of Power-Train, Inc., and 
that Power-Train, Inc. would receive the ultimate assignments), 
to enter into the Agreements attached hereto as E.xhibits A through 
D, and orally represented and warranted to Wynn and Power-Train, 
Inc. as follows: , . 
. - ' • • • * < 
(a) That the Mini-Sam patents were good, viable, 
legally unassailable, solid and that they would stand 
up under close scrutiny; 
(b) That the Mini-Sam motor was a perfected device 
which was capable of immediate manufacture and dissemina-
tion; ' * 
(<•) Tint I: l.lin Mi n i-,'i/uii inol.or W/i f« prol'flftftio/ui IJ, y tm*\ 
properly designed with the best engineering talents avail-
able; 
Cd) Jhat the Defendant, Stuver, was the.sole inventor 
of both the Mini-Sam'motor and the pump devices' and had 
all right, title and interest in and to any patent rights* 
thereto; 
(e) That the Defendant, Stuver, had applied said 
MinirSam motor to various automotive devices which worked 
and functioned perfectly; . 
(f) That said Mini^ -Sam motor was capable of driving 
an ordinary automotive vehicle and bralve the speed in 
excess of eighty (8 6) miles per hrour; 
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(g) That all of those who assisted him were paid 
; .in full and that the appropriates releases were obtained; 
(h) That the Mini-Sam would become an instantaneous 
success to Power-Train, Inc.; *•'•• *' 
(i) That it would not take more than Fifty Thousand 
Dollars ($50,000) to begin the manufacture of the Mini-Sam 
to the point where Power-Train would have a perfected, fully 
working prototype vehicle which'would be fully operable on 
either a truck or automobile; *. -
. (j) That it would not take more than Fifty Thousand 
Dollars ($50,000) to, begin the effective manufacture of 
t h e p u m p ; * ' ' . . . • • • 
• ' • • • ' . * 
(k) That he owned all of the necessary equipment,^ •; 
molds, patterns and other basic items of manufacturing • ~ 
necessary to the manufacturing of the said Mini-Sam; * 
(1) That he had not conveyed any of his right, 
title and interest in and to the Mini-Sam and/or .the pump 
. to others; 
(m) , That he would lend his best efforts in cooperating . 
with the Plaintiffs in the setting up of the manufacture, 
and marketing'of the allegedly /'perfected deviccsM; and 
(n) That ho would not cauiio d is Uul>ance?> or, intorfef* 
with any o£ the omployeos or business contacts of tho 
I Plaintiffs; and ' • ' . . 
(o) That he would otherwise lend his best efforts to 
'* see the Power-Train projects through successfully. . 
13, .That the aforesaid representations were false and 
were there known by the Defendant to be false.. . . 
14. That the Plaintiffs believed and'.relied upon the 
aforesaid representations and'thereby were induced to enter into 
the Agreements with the Defendant'and make payments pursuant 
^thereto. 
. 1 5 . That by reason of the Defendant's misrepresenta t ions ' 
a ** tt OM4»»*aci t*1 riii»l a*? t\ d i r e c t fuul iMtixhitfUe t ^ t t l i t i ter** F»*»MH| Hi« 
• ' • ' • . / . • • 
- . • • . ' • • • . - 4 - • : • : • . • ' , v . . ' " 
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Plaintiffs have suffered damage^to their name, business, business 
reputation and have suffered serious and{- severe damages. . . 
16. That the Defendant has acted and continues to act 
in a willful, wrongful, fraudulent and deceitful manner'so as . 
to damage the Plaintiffs in an amount in excess of Two Hundred 
Fifty Thousand.Dollars ($250,000). 
17. In addition, the Plaintiffs seek punitive damages 
in an amount of One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000), together, 
with costs and other expenses including attorney's fees,. 
• COUNT TWO 
18. Paragraphs 1 through.17 of Plaintiffs1 Complaint -
are hereby incorporated by reference. 
19. Upon information and belief, the Plaintiffs do ; 
hereby assert that the Defendant is not the inventor of the . -: 
Mini-Sam motor and of the pump. In fact, the Defendant has
 % 
used other persons' ideas and claimed them as his own, when in 
fact he knew or had reason to know they were not his own. ..." 
20. • As a result of the misrepresentations as alleged 
in this Count, the Plaintiffs have been damaged.in the amount 
of One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000). 
1
 7 
'£1% I n m i d i. I i o n , U i n I11 n i n I I I I n tnuil' | H i i » I l V v ' * «1 #J iii -ri j ; <-? 
as a .result of the willful, wrongful and intentional misconduct' 
of the Defendant, in an amount of Fifty Thousand'Dollars ($50,000), 
together with costs and other expenses including attorney's fees. 
. ' • l - : COUNT THREE 
- 22. Paragraphs 1 through 21.of Plaintiffs' Complaint 
are.hereby incorporated by reference, * 
23•, Althoup.h the Defendant has represented that tho 
•Mini-Sam motor^ and the pump were perfected devices and that they 
were readily available to and'were capable of being instantly 
'manufactured, the contrary is true. Such devices were not ready 
for manufacture; could not be manufactured, easily; wore not per- . 
fected; were improperly engineered; did not take care of the 
• " : ' • ' • . . ; . . ~ 5 ~ • • • ' • ' . < • : • : . - • - • . • , • 
* . " . ' - • * • ' . : • • : . • ' - • • " . . . 
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necessary difficulties; could not be readily adopted to automo-
. tive or other machinery devices; were overly expensive to make; 
and then did not function as Stuver, the Defendant, lias represented. 
24, As a result of the misrepresentations as alleged 
-v* in this Count, the Plaintiffs have been, damaged in the amount 
of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($250,000). 
25, In addition, the Plaintiffs seek punitive damages 
as a result of the willful, wrongful and intentional misconduct 
of the Defendant, in an amount*of One Hundred Thousand Dollars 
($100,000), 
COUNT FOUR , 
26, Paragraphs 1 through 25 of Plaintiffs' Complaint
 t , ' 
are hereby, incorporated by reference. ^ 
27, * The Defendant, in entering into the Agreements, 
continually made representations that he would give full and 
complete cooperation in working together to accomplish the' • 
exploitation of the Mini-Sam "motor and the pump. 
28, In fact, Stuver.agreed to become employed by Power-
» 
Train, Inc. and represented himself to have, great scientific 
and mechanical knowledge .concerning the Mini-Sam, wliich is commonly 
, talUnl the* MPOWCI*-TI4M i.nf,t ' , l ^ 
21). In onturing into such n }'# IMMMIMMI L f> f lituvor m i f;rr!pr<j'><jnte<I 
that ho had aLl of the technical know-how necessary to begin the many 
facture of the Mini-Sam,. Power-Train motor and pump. In fact, 
Stuver did not have such expertise, engineering or manufacturing , . 
know-how, 
30. As a result of their reliance upon Stuverfs misrepre-
sentations and to his know-how, the Plaintiffs have expended ex-
orbitant amounts of money all to .their loss and expense. The 
cdevelopments the Plaintiffs have accomplished were accomplished 
without any help from the Defendant and without reliance upon any 
• expertise or inventions of the Defendant „ . 
< . • ' • ' " • ' - . ' ' 
' • ' ' / . . • " ' • ' ' - • 
• • • • ' • ' • " • ' - H - ' ' " • • . . -
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31. As a result of the over-expenditure of funds in * 
reliance upon the misrepresentations of Stuver, which Stuver 
knew to be false at the time that'he made them, Power-Train, Inc. 
and Jack H. Wynn have been damaged in an amount in excess of 
Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($250,000). 
32. In addition, the Plaintiffs seek punitive damages 
as a result of the willful, wrongful and intentional.misconduct 
of the Defendant, in an amount of One Hundred-Thousand Dollars 
($100,000). s s v ' ... . # . 
; . COUNT FIVE ' 
33. Paragraphs 1 through 32 of Plaintiffs1 Complaint 
are hereby incorporated by reference. • • 
- 34,. The Defendant continued to represent, throughout ^ •• 
all of the negotiations, subsequent employment and subsequent 
losses of Power-Train, that the Mini-Sam and pump devices were 
economically viable and perfected products-and were immediately 
capable of manufacturing into a single truck or automobile veliicle 
and then, after the-worth of the single vehicle was Remonstrated, 
the full manufacturing would be easily and inexpensively instituted. 
35. In fact, the inventions as they existed and as the 
Defendant misrepresented them, wore not economically viable or 
perfecLed products. , ' • ' ' . 
•36. The Plaintiffs have spent extraordinary amounts 
of monies trying to make said products viable, when in fact they, 
as ,they existed at the time of the original misrepresentations, 
were not perfected or economially viable. 
37. As a result of the over-expenditure of funds .in 
reliance upon the misrepresentations of Stuver, which Stuver 
knew to be false at the.time that ho made them, power-Train, 
Inc. has been damaged in an amount in excess of Two Hundred Fifty 
Thousand Dollars ($250,000). ' • 
•38, In addition, the Plaintiffs seek punitive damages 
as a result of the willful/ wrongful and-intentional misconduct. 
• • - " ' • • ' • ' » : " ' • • . • • • • • . ' ' . • ~ 
-J- • 
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of the Defendant, in an amount .of-One Hundred Thousand Dollars 
,($100,00.0). .. '••"•• '••'•.'( .'. • • ' • 
t 
C O U N T six. ••;".. . 
39. Paragraphs 1 through 38 of Plaintiffs' Complaint 
are hereby incorporated by reference, 
40. During the time that the Defendant contracted with 
the Plaintiffs, the Defendant deliberately, willfully, and 
wantonly sabotaged much of the equipment, manufacturing devices, . 
devices and research data of the Plaintiffs. '. 
41. Such deliberate $abotage and destruction of equipment, 
manufacturing devices and devices has cost the Plaintiffs damages 
in excess of One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000) and unknown 
/ 
additional damages, which will be offered at the time of trial,^ } 
as a result the delays caused to the overall programs of the 
•> 
Plaintiffs. . • . . • } < % 
42. In addition, the Plaintiffs seek punitive damages, 
as a result of the willful, deliberate and wanton conduct of the • 
Defendant in the amount of Fifty Tliousand Dollars ($50,000) together 
with costs and other expenses including attorney's fees. 
• ' '• •. • COUNT SEVEN 
* • • I ' r • -
'15 * Ptfr«nruphr* I I l»roh}>li, 4 2 oi] IM n ! n t; i f fn f Co/ripUuafc 
aro hereby incorporated by reference. 
44. IjispLto ol* a'LL tho representation?* and m i s rep re sunt a, ~ 
tions made by the Defendant, that the Defendant had all the right, 
title and interest 1in and to the yarious inventions and that the 
Defendant would not interfere in any-manner with the Plaintiffs 1 
rights to said inventions, the Defendant entered into other con-
tracts affecting said inventions and patents, in violation of his 
Agreements with tho Plaintiffs. , •"'..••' 
~ 45. As a result of the Defendant's willful and wrongful 
actions in entering into other.contracts affecting the patents and 
alleged inventions of the Defendant, the Plaintiffs have been 
damaged, in an amount in. excess of One Hundred-Tliousand Dollars 
rti nh hnni , ... ' . .-.'. / 
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46. In addition,' the Plaintiffs,seek punitive damages, 
as a result of the willful, deliberate and wanton conduct of 
the Defendant in the amount of Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000) 
together with costs and other expenses including attorney's 
fees. 
COUNT EIGHT 
47. Paragraphs 1 through 46 of Plaintiffs' Complaint 
are hereby incorporated by reference. 
48. The Defendant has intentionally, willfully and 
wrongfully interfered with .the business contacts, contracts and 
advantages of the Plaintiffs by intentionally.dealing with others 
on said alleged patents and inventions without consulting with ' I 
the Plaintiffs and at such times and places as to cause the .. 
Plaintiffs serious and severe damages, ' 
49. As a result of the over-expenditure of funds' in 
reliance upon the misrepresentations of Stuver, which Stuver 
knew to be false at the time that he made them, Power-Train, 
Inc. and Jack H. Wynn have been damaged in an amount in excess 
of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($250,000). 
\ * 
Y 
50. In addition, /the Plaintiffs soak punitive damages, 
as a resu.lL of tho willful, do J,ibora I o unci wanton conduct of 
the Defendant in the amount'of One Hundred Thousand Dollars 
C$100,000) together with costs and other expenses including 
attorney's fees, i , * . . • • ; v 
' - COUNT NINE -1 • • 
51. Paragraphs 1 through 50 of Plaintiffs1 Complaint 
* * • ' * • ' ' ' * 
are hereby incorporated by reference. . 
• 52, As a result of the misrepresentations of the Defendant, 
upon which the plaintiffs relied,' the Plaintiffs'have made cer-
1
 tain payments to the Defendant who has taken such payments under 
false pretenses, when in fact, the Defendant knew he .did not 
have perfected inventions which were economically viable. , 
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53. As a result of the misrepresentations of the Defeh-
• dant, Power-Train, Inc. has been damaged in an amount in excess-
of One Hundred Thousand Dollars :($100,000)'. 
54. In addition, tlie Plaintiffs seek punitive-damages, 
-v' as a result of the willful, deliberate and wanton conduct of 
the Defendant in the amount of Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000) * 
together with costs and other expenses including attorney's fees. 
' • \ COUNT TEN . 
.55. Paragraphs 1 through 54 of Plaintiffs' Complaint 
are hereby incorporated by reference. 
56. During all of- the time in which the Defendant was 
acting pursuant to the contract with the Plaintiffs, the Defendant, 
continually, intentionally, willfully and wrongfully interferred 
with the actions of and the work of the various employees of 
the Plaintiffs. 
57. As a result of the Defendant's wrongful and inten-
tional interference with the Vork to be performed by the various 
employees of the Plaintiffs, the Plaintiffs have been damaged 
in an amount in excess ,of One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000) 
' ' ' v 
Cor which recovery is-herein sought, 
Sit, In mlil ill nuf l,ho N H i ill. i l"f ?i HOO|> pun i I; W o <J/im*f JMM> , 
US n result ol; the wLlIful, deliberate niid w;nil.:on conduct, of 
the Defendant in the. amount of fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000) 
together with costs and other expenses including attorney's fees. 
' COUNT m/iiVHN 
* ....«• ~y.. , -1..4. . i« . . - L ... ~. 
59. Paragraphs 1 through 58 of Plaintiffs' Complaint 
are hereby incorporated by reference. v . . • . 
f>0i The' PePniulnnl: mirsroprn^ nnfcntl l)u»t he loot cprtiun 
ownership of patterns, molds and other necessary ^ equipment or 
^materials. These patterns, molds and other necessary equipment 
and materials were necessary in tlie manufacturing of the Mini-Sam 
' and pump. 
61, In fact, the Defendant did not have ownership of said 
patterns, molds and other materials as represented.. 
/ 
' -10- •*' ." : 
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62. As a result of the Defendant's willful and wrongful 
(' . • 
• misrepresentations, upon which the Plaintiffs relied to their ' 
detriment, the Plaintiffs have been damaged in an amount in" 
excess of Twenty-five Thousand Dollars ($25,000). ' '• 
-v 63. In addition, the Plaintiffs seek punitive damages, 
as a result of the willful, deliberate and wanton conduct of1 
the Defendant in the amount of Twelve Thousand Five Hundred 
Dollars ($12,500). 
• ' COUNT TWELVE -
64• Paragraphs 1 through 63 of Plaintiffs' Complaint 
are hereby incorporated by reference. -
65. The Defendant willfully and wrongfully represented • / 
that he was the sole owner of the patents and rights to the 
inventions involved in the Exhibits attached.hereto. : 
66. The Defendant fully knew that he was not the-sole 
owner of such rights, but had conveyed certain interests to others. 
67. As a result of the willful and wrongful misrepresenta-
tions of the Defendant, upon which the Plaintiffs have relied to 
their detriment, the Plaintiffs have been forced to resolve cer-
tain claims by third parties at korioun cor»t.f; find expense to the 
Pta luti t\l\s iu extuMis of Twenty-live Thousand Dollar.1) ($2fifD00j. 
68t That by reason of the actions of the Defendant with 
regard to the foregoing, the Plaintiff has been damaged in an 
amount in excess of Twenty-five Thousand Dollars ($25,000). 
69; In addition, the Plaintiffs seek punitive damages, . • 
as a result of the willful, deliberate and wanton conduct of 
the Defendant in the amount of'Twelve Thousand Five Hundred ' .. 
Dollars ($12,500) . 
•
 (
 -COUNT TillRTl:IiN * '.'••. "• 
70, Paragraphs 1 through 69 of Plaintiffs' Complaint • 
are hereby incorporated by reference. 
*
 t 71, The Defendant willfully and wrongfully made mis-
rmirn^rjiftaMOMS, to the PlaintIfFs* opotf whtrh ( 1<P V(>IHjfji( • ? f-^t iht\ 
to their detriment, that the Mini-Sam motor would drive a normal 
/ 
* * • • ; . • ' " 
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Detroit built automobile in excess of Eighty (80) miles per hour 
and that said motor was perfected, when in fact said motor was " .• 
jjiot perfected and at its best would not drive a vehicle in accor-
dance with any of the misrepresentations made by the Defendant . • 
to the Plaintiffs, \ \. 
72. As a result of these misrepresentations,*upon which'' 
the Plaintiffs, relied, the Plaintiffs incurred serious expenses 
and have suffered damages in excess of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand 
Dollcirs ($250,000) and had been considerably delayed in the 
effectuation of their various programs. \ .... 
73. That by reason of the actions of the Defendant with 
regard to the foregoing, upqn which the Plaintiffs have relied to 
their detriment, the Plaintiffs have been damaged in an amount 
in excess of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($250,000). # .; 
74. . In addition, the Plaintiffs seek punitive damages,- ~ 
asa result of the willful,* deliberate and wanton conduct of
 % 
the Defendant in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Dollars 
($100,000). * ' . '.' '. 
COUNT FOURTEEN • . 
7.5. Paragraphs 1 through 74 of Plaintiffs1 Complaint 
are hereby incorporated by reference. ' 
76. Upou 1 n I OI'MH I i on anil, bn'Mof, I ho P l a in ! iff** do }K;Jol>y > 
nvor »l:.luit L'ho Dol'ondnnl h<rt boon f i n a n c i a l l y Mipporuu.1 by ot l iar 
t h i r d p a r t y hives loi'.s who formerly wo ru the cotithclv, of tho 
P l a i n t i f f s and t h a t s a id i n v e s t o r s a r e suppor t ing the.Defendant 
in some or all of :the willful and wrongful actions listed herein-
before including, but not limited to, the actions of champerty and 
maintenance,^ in fostering Stuver's unjust lawsuit, in California. 
* • 
77. In accepting !;ho financial backing by persons who 
were formerly .dealing "with Power-Train, Inc.,. the Defendant has 
intentionally, willfully "and wrongfully interferred with the relation-
ships for which the Plaintiffs, spent a great deal of money and 
t i m e . . ^ ' "•;'*.
 r •: • 
• : ,.".'• -12-
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78. As a result
 0f the tortious interference oftthe Defen-
dant, the Plaintiffs have been damaged in an amount in excess of 
One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000). • 
79. In addition, the Plaintiffs seek punitive damages, 
as a result of the willful, deliberate and wanton conduct of 
the Defendant in the amount of Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000). 
" COUNT FIFTEEN y 
80. Paragraphs 1 through 79 of Plaintiffs1 Complaint are 
' , • • . * . 
hereby incorpor«ated by reference. 
81. Plaintiffs, at great expense, and without the aid of the 
Defendant, have developed various automotive products and inventions 
which are secret in nature. . .'* 
82. The Defendant has evidenced various desires to interrupt, 
and destroy the.creative, inventive and viable activities of the 
Plaintiffs under the guise, among other things, that he was the 
inventor of the Power-Train devices. 
83. By reason of the" facts alleged herein, the Defendant 
should be required to account to the Plaintiffs for any and all 
profits or arrangements made by him, directly or indirectly, as a 
result of his willful, wanton, wrongful, illegal and fraudulent 
' i 
conduct; i » 
84. \\y reason of the los.sos suffered by PJ M iutif f x, the 
Plaintiffs heroin rociuost equitable relief from any further obliga- , 
tion or obligations to the Defendant. .. 
85. Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law.*
 # . 
86. An injunction should be ordered preventing the Defen-1 
dant and his agents,' employees-and/or business associates from 
committing any further wrongful acts. 
87. Plaintiffs hereby request that they .have such other 
and further relief as may be just and proper, with costs and dis-
bursements of this action, including the fair and reasonable allowance" 
for counsel fees and other lawful expenses, in connection with the 
'prosecution of this action. ; • . . 
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WHEREFORE, these Plaintiffs demand that judgment be entered .• 
in their, favor.for the following: •'. < . • 
. 1 . As to Count One Two Hundred-Fifty Thousand Dollars 
C$250,000) general compensatory damages and One Hundred'Thousand 
Dollars ($100,000) in -punitive damages; * 
2,;* As to Count Two, One Hundred Thousand Dollars C$100,000) 
general compensatory damages and Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000) 
in punitive damages; ' 
3. As to Count Three, Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars 
C$250,000) general compensatory damages and One Hundred Thousand 
Dollars C$100,000) punitive.damages; - . •— ' 
4. As to Count Four, JTwo Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars 
C$250,000) general compensatory damages and One Hundred Thousand ; 
Dollars C$100,000) punitive damages; •• ~-
5. As.to Count Five, Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars » 
C$250,000) general compensatory damages and One Hundred Thousand 
Dollars C$100,000) punitive damages; Y ••' 
.' 6. • As to Count Six, One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000) 
general compensatory damages and Fifty Thousand Dollars C$50,000) » 
punitive damages;' • • <
 s 
7. As to Count Seven, One Hundred Thousand Dollars 
C$100,000) general compensatory damages and Fifty Thousand Dollars 
($50,000) punitive damages; 
8, As to Count Eight, Two Hundred Fifty Thousand • 
Dollars C$250,000)1 general compensatory damages and One Hundred 
Thousand Dollar? ($100,000) punitive-damages; 
9* As to Count Nine, One Hundred Thousand Dollars 
C$100,000) general compensatory damages and Fifty Thousand Dollars 
"($50, 000) punitive damages ;' 
- 10, As to Count Ten, One Hundred Thousand Dollars 
($100,000.) general compensatory damages and Fifty Thousand Dollars 
($50,000) punitive damages; - • • 
, .11. As to Count Eleven, Twenty-five'Thousand Dollars ' 
($25,000) general compensatory damages and Twelve Thousand Five 
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Hundred Dollars ($12,500). punitive damages; - . ' 
12. As to Count Twelve^ Twenty-five Thousand Dollars . 
($25,000) general compensatory damages and Twelve Thousand Five 
Hundred Dollars ($12,500) punitive damages; ' .. -. 
13. As to Count Thirteen, Two Hundred Fifty Thousand 
Dollars ($250,000) general compensatory damages'and One Hundred 
Thousand Dollars ($100,000) punitive damages; 
14. As to Count Fourteen, One Hundred Thousand Dollars 
($100,000) general compensatory damages and Fifty Thousand Dollars 
($50,000) punitive damages. 
15. As to Count Fifteen, -by reason of the losses suffered 
by Plaintiffs, the Plaintiffs herein request equitable relief fr.om, • 
any further obligation or obligations to the Defendant and an order 
enjoining the Defendant from interferring with the business of the. 
Plaintiffs. .An injunction should be ordered preventing the Defen-
dant and his agents, employees and/or business associates from 
committing any further wrongful acts. 
16. Plaintiffs hereby request that they have such other 
and further relief as may be just and proper, with costs and dis-
bursements of this action, inclutling the fair and reasonable allowanc 
for counsel fees and other lawful.expenses in connection with the 
proMvul ion of Ihi.'t ml Son, 
DATlil) this t.ho ^ j ^ d a y of June, 1975. . ; 
HAT0i§ TLUMB 
JUJ-. 
^•nlc^ . Orrin G. Hatch Attorney for Plaintiffs 
POWER-TRAIN, INC. 
A / / ' A A /?
 0 ' 
By, ^/f^^f/^fi^^^ 
1 ( <~U 
• /VACK U. WYNN • 
/ 
/ 
/ 
V / 
•15-
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L. JANSSEN. 
:OS?3ETT 
UNO 
lOStf tTS. 
RNSYS-AT-iMW 
HILL, JAJJSSEM, C0R3ETT ft R03ERTS 
Attornaya a t Law
 c-
730 F i f th S t r e e t 
Post Offica Box 105 
Eureka, Ca l i fo rn ia 95501 
Telophond (70?) M2-2927 
Attornaya for Bafandanta 
P0W2R-TRAIS, IMC, and 
JACK H. mm 
/ - J y Xskss, S\3?-:-,: »..,;. 
r 
* 
I 
I, BARBARACBRUMBELOW 
III THE SUPERIOR COUHT 0? THE STATS 0? CALIFORNIA 
It? AMD-FOR THE COUNTY 07 HUMBOLDT 
PAUL M. 5TUVER, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
v . 
JACK H. VSfNN; POWER-TRAIN, INC., 
a co rpora t ion , e t a l . , 
Defendants. 
•Ho. 56571 
SUPPORTING D2CLABATI03 
0? 
DONALD B, ROBERTS 
/ 
I , DONALD B. ROBERTS, Saqui ra , make the following d e c l a r a -
t ion under penal ty of pe r ju ry : 
That I am tha a t torney for defendants h e r e i n . That I 
was r e f e r r ed the defense of defendant3 by a t to rney Orrln G. Hatch, 
420 Cont inenta l Bank Bui ld ing , S a l t Laka Ci ty , Utah. That a t tha 
tljne of s a i d r e f e r r a l , Attorney Hatch advised n» t h a t ha contem-
p l a t e d f i l i n g l ega l proceadlns3 agains t the p l a i n t i f f s in tha 
S ta t e of Utah, That Hatch advised tha t beeau3a of the' Utah f i l i n g 
he f e l t t h a t Croaa-coisplalnt should not ba f i l e d a t the t i n e the 
Answer was f i l ed in the Ins t an t a c t i o n . That thsrsaffcar , Mr. Hatcfcj 
- 1 -
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X 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
.13 
14 
15 
16 
17 I 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
did file a Complaint against the plaintiffs in the within action 
in the District Court of the Third Judicial District in and for 
Salt Lake County, Stats of Utah, File No. 223733. That sub-
sequently, notion was reads by thi» attorneys to? Paul M. Stuver 
in the said Utah action to dismiss the Utah Corsplalnt on the theor; 
that the compulsory. corss-cosiplainfc statutes of both states re-
quired that the said Cosnplalnt against said Paul Stuyer be filed 
in the' within action. That on Septen&er 17, 1975, the Honorable 
Bryand H. Croft, Judge of the Third Judicial District Court, Salt 
Lake County, did enter his .Minute Order dismissing the Utah action 
That your declarant was advised of said decision on September 29, 
1975. That thereafter, after due consultations with my.client 
and with attorney Hatch, would determine that your declarant 
should file the accompanying isotion for leave to file crosa-
coisplaint herein. That attorney Hatch has filed a Notice of 
Appeal of the dismissal of the Utah action. 
That the accompanying proposed cross-eoaplaint filed 
herewith, -^ hiie different in form, is substantially similar to 
the action filed in Utah. That Paul Stuver and his attorneys 
have bean aware of the claims stade by defendants against said 
Paul Stuver« That no .prejudice will .reault to the plaintiff 
herein from allowing leave to file the Cress-complaint herein and 
try the sjattar on the merits in California in the event that 
appeal froia the Utah decision is unsuccessful/ 
Executed under penalty of perjury on Hoveisbar J^L* 1975. 
DONALD B.ROBERTS 
.•JANSSEN. 
OR3ETT 
03ERTS 
tNcYS-AT-lAW 
Donald B. Roberts, Esquire 
^ ^ 
* . CALIFORNIA 
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7 
I HILL, JANS3EN, CORBSTT & ROBERTS 
| Attorneys at Law 
1
 730 Fifth Street 
Post Office Box 106 
Eureka, California 95501 
Telephone (707) 442-2927 
Attorneys for Cross-complainants 
IfllEWjS"^ 
k « JAN &1976 
/ -1 
Stokes, Steeves. Truitt, CalBgan & Warren 
. A T T O J ^ Y S ^QOVttJ jO 
'
 , v
'—. £ 
r 
i 
r 
e 
> 
v . 
> 
J 
il 
E 
C 
COUNry
 C L a S . ~ 
jAn .. v
 ]9;-e 
* ® > m F.. FOLKS D 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT 0? THE STATS 0? CALIFORNIA 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF HUMBOLDT 
Fr?™RfP\m!> INC- and JACK H, WYNN, 
Cross-complainants, 
: : V. 
PAUL M STUVER and DOES I 
through X, 
No. 56571 
CROss-coapr.flTMT. 
Cro33-defendants. 
/ 
0"» 
22 
23 
24 
25
 I 
26
 I 
27 ! 
.L.JANSSEN 
cossrrr 
Comes now eross-coirolainant ard fflw' „ 
- " -
n a n
* ana for cause of ac t ion 
a l l e g e s : 
FIRST CAUSE ftp ACTION 
That c . o s s - c c p l a l n a n t , POWER-TiUB,,
 I N C . > t > a ^ 
Corporation duly au«mfM«»* +-~ ^ 
' "
 f l e d t 0 d
°
 a n d d o i
" S b u a l n e " » i t M n t*> S t a t e of Ca l i fo rn i a . 
I I • • ' : ' • • . ; . . ; • • " " • 
That DOES I through X ar- fctii-m,* 
-
 ar
- r-ctitous cross-defendants . 
naned herein by virtue of the fact th»-
™e iact tha„ cross-complainant does 
' - 1 - • • • ' ' : -
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1
 i not know the t rue names of sa id cross-defendants , and c r o s s -
I ' 
2
 I complainants pray leave t o amend t h e i r Cross-ccrsplaint t o s e t 
2 | fo r in the t rue names of sa id cross-defendants i f and whan the 
4 " sane are a s ce r t a i ned . 
5 II 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
I I I 
That cross-defendant , PAUL M. STUVER, I s a r e s iden t of 
the County of Humboldt, S ta te of Ca l i fo rn ia . 
• . ' ^ . . I V • " • 
That on October 20, 1973, cross-defendant , Paul M. Stuvei 
en te red i n t o an "Assignment of Le t t e r s P a t e n t , " a copy of which 
i s a t tached here to and incorporated here in by reference as 
| Exhib i t A, wherein sa id cross-defendant represented t h a t he was 
the so le and exclus ive owner of Le t t e r s Patent No. 3,090,363 i n 
the United S t a t e s Patent Office p e r t a i n i n g t o the "Mini-Sam Motor 
| a l so known as "Power-Train," and wherein he did ass ign s a i d 
L e t t e r s Patent t o cross-complainant Jack H. Wynn. 
• ' • • '
 v
 • . • ' ' • ' • • " ' ' 
That t h e r e a f t e r cross-complainant , Jack H. Wynn, as 
•3-^fQlicensed) owner of sa id Le t t e r s Pa t en t , did grant to cross-complai: 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 I 
27 
ant Power-Train, I n c . the exclusive r i g h t t o manufacture, s e l l , 
and market sa id inven t ion . A copy of sa id exclus ive p a t e n t 
l i c e n s e agreement between cross-complainant i s a t tached h e r e t o 
and incorpora ted here in by t h i s reference as Exhibi t C. 
'• VI 
That on February 20, 197*1, cross-defendant did execute 
[ an "Assignment of Righ t s , including Patent R i g h t s , " conveying 
a l l h i s r i g h t s i nc lud ing , but not l imi t ed t o the pa ten t r i g h t s t o 
IX. JANSSEN. 1 
CO30ETT 
1NO 
ROHcnTS 
W.SirS-AM.AW 
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1 
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10 
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JL 
r «\w 
•:••> a i ; 
t V£ 
17 
18 
19 
20 
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22 
23 
24 
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26 
27 
,- 8 
.L.JANSSSN. 
COR3ETT 
».« 
R03H??fS 
ISMSYJ-AT-LAW 
KA. C A U r O S M U 
if 
|i a " . • . h igh volume, moderate p r e s s u r e , r a d i a l p i s t o n , h y d r a u l i c 
U 
jj pump and b r a k i n g sys tem. . . " h e r e i n a f t e r r e f e r r e d t o a s "purnp," 
I t o J a c k H. Wyrm. A copy of s a i d agreement i s a t t a c h e d h e r e t o 
| and i n c o r p o r a t e d h e r e i n by t h i s r e f e r e n c e as E x h i b i t B„ 
VII 
On February 2 1 , 1971}* c r o s s - c o m p l a i n a n t , J a c k H. Wynn, 
g r a n t e d an E x c l u s i v e P a t e n t L icense t o c r o s s - c o m p l a i n a n t , Power-
T r a i n , I n c . , who among o t h e r t h i n g s , m a n u f a c t u r e s , u s e s , s e l l s , 
and marke t s t h e s a i d pump. A copy of s a i d E x c l u s i v e P a t e n t 
L i c e n s e agreement i s a t t a c h e d h e r e t o and i n c o r p o r a t e d h e r e i n by 
t h i s r e f e r e n c e as E x h i b i t D. 
'• • V I I I . 
* " • • • • . . 
That a t a l l t imes h e r e i n men t ioned , c r o s s - c o m p l a i n a n t , 
J a c k H. Wynn, was t h e P r e s i d e n t of Power -T ra in , I n c * : : 
IX 
N O •—^ That at all times herein mentioned, cross-defendant knew, 
that Jack H. Wynn was President of Power-Train, Inc#, and that 
ultimate assignment of Exhibits A and B would, be made by said 
Jack H. Wynn to Power-Train, Inc. 
" • X " : • • • • • 
That during t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s , before and a f t e r the 
e x e c u t i o n of t h e v a r i o u s agreements a t t a c h e d h e r e t o as E x h i b i t s 
A t h rough D, e ro35-de fendan t d id f a l s e l y and f r a u d u l e n t l y and 
wi th t h e i n t e n t t o induce Jack H. Wynn and P o w e r - T r a i n , I n c . , t o 
e n t e r i n t o s a i d agreement , d id r e p r e s e n t and w a r r a n t t o Wynn and 
Power -Tra in as f o l l o w s : 
( a ) Tha t t h e Mini-Sam p a t e n t s were good, v i a b l e , l e g a l l y 
.:••" - 3 - ' v V " 
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unassailable, solid and that they would stand up under close . 
vis -
scrutiny; .
 v 
'•••.'(b) That the Mini-Sam motor was a perfected device 
which was capable of immediate manufacture and dissemination; 
(c) That the Mini-Sam motor was professionally and 
properly designed \fith the best engineering talents available; 
(d) That the defendant, Stuver, was the sole invent or 
of both the Mini-Sam motor and the pump devices and had all 
right, title and interest in and to any patent rights' thereto; 
(e) That the defendant, Stuver, had applied said Mini-
Sam motor to various automotive devices which worked and functioi 
3 v ? ri?v%"> fy ^vvib A v T u — V * 4-*% V u - . 
ed perfectly; 
' i > 
ti^'ty (^ That said Mini-Sam motor was capable of driving an 
*& . 
ordinary automotive vehicle and brake the speed in excess of 
' ——-~~** Av r i t /V^-v^ $*;-*-• i-O'j >v.fv- f^/A, r:.-t. *~-
eighty (80) miles per hour;^1^' *'Ci "'"*' vr **>»*:. * w 
(g) That all of those *?ho assisted him were paid in full 
gfUS CtuZ^^Mxi QU,^ 
and that the appropriate releases were obtained; 
(h) That the Mini-Sam would become an instantaneous 
Ont *&&*>/* f'frifZ* o** OV *****-OtAf/'Uzr 
success to Power-Train, Inc.; 
\ * (i) That it would not take more than Fifty Thousand 
* A/0 
Dollars ($50,000) to begin the manufacture of the Hlni-Sam/to 
the point where Power-Train would have a perfected, fully working 
prototype vehicle which would be fully operable on either a truck 
or automobile; ' v 
(*&*($) That it would not take more than Fifty Thousand 
Dollars ($50,000) to begin the effective manufacture of the pump; 
,f£ (k) That he owned all of the necessary equipment, molds 
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p a t t e r n s , and o the r bas ic items of manufacturing necessary to 
t h e manufacturing of the sa id Mini-Sam;-
 % 
cfrA1' (1) That he had not conveyed any of h i s r i g h t , t i t l e , 
and i n t e r e s t in and to the Mini-Sam and/or the pump to o the rs j 
(m) That he would lend hi3 bes t e f f o r t s i n coopera t ing 
with the p l a i n t i f f s in the s e t t i n g up of the manufacture, and 
„ rrioro^ UP} 
market ing/of the a l legedly "perfected d e v i c e s 9 ; ^ ^ Jn& 
*ptfz&jV(n) That he would not. cause d is turbances or i n t e r f e r e 
with1 any of the employees or business contac ts of the P l a i n t i f f s ; 
a n d '••';•' * 
^i/U (o) That he would otherwise lend h i s b e s t e f f o r t s t o see 
the Power-Train p r o j e c t s through success fu l ly ; 
/it?* fit^t (p) i n e n t e r i n g i n t o such agreements, Stuver misrepresenl 
#^tvJ 
ed tha t he had a l l of the t e c h n i c a l know-how necessary t o begin 
t he manufacture of the Mini-Sam, Power-Train motor, and pump. 
In f a c t , Stuver did not have such e x p e r t i s e , engineer ing or 
manufacturing know-how, T 
PATvrwo., (q) The defendant continued to r e p r e s e n t , throughout a l l 
of the n e g o t i a t i o n s , subsequent employment and subsequent l o s se s 
of Power-Train, t h a t the Mini-Sam and^pumn) devices were economical 
l y viable and perfected products and were immediately capable of 
manufacturing i n t o a s ing le t ruck or automobile vehic le and t h e n , 
a f t e r the worth of the s ing le vehic le wa& demonstrated, t h e f u l l 
manufacturing would be e a s i l y and inexpensively i n s t i t u t e d . . 
XI 
That sa id r ep re sen ta t ions and each of them were f a l s e and 
t h a t the cross-defendant knew sa id r e o r e s e n t a t i o n s t o be f a l s e a t 
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the time he made then. 
XII 
That cross-complainants be l ieve such r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s to 
be t rue and r e l i e d upon sa id r ep resen ta t ions In e n t e r i n g i n t o 
s a id agreements with cross-defendants and making payments pursua 
t h e r e t o . • • .. ' • • 
:
:
 XIII 
That as an approximate r e s u l t of these misrepresenta t ion! 
cross-complainants have been damaged i n a sum In excess o f 
One Mil l ion Dollars ($1,000,000) . 
. . '
 X I V
 • : ' . ; - • ' • • " 
That the mis representa t ions and ac t ions of cro33-defendaz 
he re in descr ibed were f raudulen t , ma l i c ious , and opp re s ive , and 
as a r e s u l t the reof , cross-complainants seek exemplary damages 
here in i n the amount of One Mill ion Dol lars ($1 ,000 ,000) . 
WHEREFORE, cro3s-complainant pray Judgment as he r e ina f t e r 
a l l eged . 
SECOND CAUSE 0 ? ACTION 
• • • •
 I
 ' • • • ' • • . . • • 
, Cross-complainants hereby adopt and r e s t a t e t he a l l e g a t l o 
of Paragraphs I through IX of the F i r s t Cause of Action and by 
t h i s reference Incorpora tes them h e r e i n . 
'
 X I 
Cross-complainants have performed a i l the c o n d i t i o n s , 
covenants , and promises under agreements A and C on t h e i r p a r t t o 
be performed. 
- 6 -Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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That after October 20, 1973, cross-defendant breached 
said agreements by entering into agreements v/itl i. ,! * third party 
concerning said ii ivai itlons and patent^jin violation o.r said. 
contract,.-by interferring with the work being-performed by cross 
complainant1 s employees oi i de velopment of said inventions , by -. 
fai ling to cooperate, failing to use his best effort t< :> deve3 ::::p 
and perfect the said inven tioi is., • • ';;;' •.-•''•'•./ -
I V 
. "'As a-result of said bre aches of sai d agreements
 3 cross-
eompla:! nant has been damaged and delayed in the development of'-' 
said inventions as well as other related business matters • I t a 
\. ^ ^ I has been damaged j n reputatj en within tl :ie industry/" all to cro3s-
***** •
 ,: : :
 « complainants damage in a sum. in excess of Two Hundred Fifty 
Thousand Dollars ($250,000). 
• WHEREFORE^  cross-complainants pray Judgment a^ hereinafte 
alleged. 
• • ' • '' - ' T H I R D C A l f S E O F A C T I O N ..'/•;• " 
J Cross-complainants hereby adopt and. restate tv ^ ~-V?;atior 
| o* Paragraphs through IX of the First; 'MLU,:•' of z:.^°, and »y 
'
 !
 rr*ivr. .: icorporate them herein. 
. .. , ..... ;. • ; ..
 ; ... .- ' . • II ' • \ 
I • .": -From October 20, 1973, * to date, cross-defendant, knowing 
,^ _;i — | i.: cross-complainant was engaged in th.r business of a--• ?l.;c :.ng .' 
I the intentions described in the agreements attached hereto, as 
I v^vl a :> i : ytiii ar inventions, with the malicious intent and design ! 
fl
 of obstructing and interferring with the . .--.cessful operation of 
2 3 
24 
25 
26 
27 
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c r o s s - c o m p l a i n a n t s b u s i n e s s , w i l l f u l l y , knowing ly , and m a l i c i o u s 
l y i n t e r f e r r e d wi th the opsrnt.tf/'i or it' ' c ro^s-*boinpla inant t s 
p l a n t , a t t e m p t e d t o convey r i g h t s in t h e i n v e n t i o n s d e s c r i b e d i n 
E x h i b i t s ft and C t o t h i r d p a r t i e s , tn* 'p 11 cn-J 1,. t o n l a c t e d o t h e r 
v; ; c 6 j i v t.n sn id p a t e n t s and i n v e n t i o n s w i t h o u t t h e consen t o: 
n o t i c e to c ro3S~complainants and has a t t e m p t e d t o r- ' " •:' / I ; 
nr--i - • *•'• -ly froia d e a l i n g wl fch t h i r d p a r t i e s w i t h r e g a r d t o 
aaic: inventions and p r o f i t s . ( C r o s s - d e f e n d a n t s have i n t e r f e r r e d 
w i t h t h e r e l a t i o n s ! ! > •«. ^.<,i:^.-*t, p o t e n t i a l 
cus tomers and inves tors^} / / o 
l i x " \ _ • 
A3 a tili.v.._ _ : J p roximate r e s u l t of t h e wrongfu l conduct 
•
 r
 de fendant a l l e g e d i n Paragraph I I h e r e i n , cross-corn: >la inant -" 
hp 5 3U3taJnod damages from l o s s of b u s i n e s s , damage t o r e p u t a t i o n 
and de lay :• vl p roduc t ion and p e r f e c t i o n of v a r i o u s p r o d u c t s to 
c ros s -co inp la inan t » da ma^* lu th *• :nn:i Jn exceyn r,f PI re Hundred 
Thousand D o l l a r s | fay reason of t he i n t e n t i o n a l , knowing, d e l i b e r a 
and m a l i c i o u s conduct of defendant as a l l e g e : ! h e r e i n , p l a i n t i f f 
i n a d d i t i o n seeks exemplary damages from defendant, i n t h e sum of 
P ive Hundred Thousand D o l l a r s ($500,000)* 
..-' . FOURTH CAUi' i)V ACTION , .- . 
I ' . 
C ros s - compla inan t hereby adopts r.rul redtat-vu k)^.i a l l e g a -
Pa rag raphs I through IX and XIV o f t he F i r s t Cause of 
Act ion and by t h i s r e f e r e n c e i n c o r p o r a t e s them h e r - ^ r u 
I I 
K
 Vi C r o s s - d e f e n d a n t s , on or a f t e r Oc tober 2 0 , 1973 , d id 
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i n t e n t i o n a l !t\ de s t roy r»ml In jure equipment and m a n u f a c t u r i n g 
d e v i c e s of c r o s s - c o m p l a i n a n t . % 
. ' • • - - I " : 
- -i 
That as a d i r e c t and proximate r e s u l t , , s a i d d e s t r u c t i o n 
of equipment and devices.,, cross-rompl; ! in-int has twen damaged i n 
t h e :,'![,) o r One Hundred Thousand D o l l a r s ; t h a t t h e s a i d a c t i o n s 
were m a l i c i o u s and e p p r e s i v e as * c ros s - compla in v1': 
C ros s - compla inan t s r e q u e s t exemplary damage3 in t h e ,u -: 
; F i f t y Thousand D o l l a r s (550*000) . 
WHEREFORE, oroa';~eoraJ.ai.n -:.i *. - ,^ :> judgiaens as f o l l r w r : 
i - For damage on t h e F i r s t Cause of Ac t ion ±i> zhz amount 
of One M i l l i o n D o l l a r s ( $ 1 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 ) ; 
•.
 :
' 2 . fork I ' un i t l ve damages : a t h ? F i r s t Cause of A c t i o n 
in t h e amount o f One M i l l i o n D o l l a r s f)\ '":^:\(}0r^ 
•J i 'W damag^M or; tlw Second Cause o f Ac t ion a c c o r d i n g . 
t o p roo f i n e x c e s s of Two Hundred F i f t y Thousand D o l l a r s ($250, ,00i 
*wr damages on fch? Third Cau...o of Ac t ion a c c o r d i n g t o 
proof' in e x c e s s of Five Hundred Thousand D o l l a r s ( $ 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 ) ; .'. " 
wn-r p u n i t i v e damages on the Third Cause of Ac t ion i n 
t.hf ano ui Hundred Thousand D o l l a r s ( $ 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 ) ; 
re damages on t h e Four th Cause o f Act ion in KM* 
amount ox One Hundred Thousand Do.Uar* ($ LOU ,0on)
 (l 
7 . For p u n i t i v e damages on t h e Four th Cause o f Ac t ion n 
t h e amount of F i f t y Thousand D o l l a r s ($ (IO,000);- ••••.•.,. •• . / 
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